essential motivation. The three key rescue m issions undertaken since 1989-the Kurdish, Somali, and Bosnian operations-were understood as noble attem pts to give substance to that form less yet blam eless entity, "the international conscience." Yet Conradian continuities continue to haunt these operations: the ironic interplay between noble intentions and bloody results, between fantasies o f om nipotent benevolence and im potent practice, between initial self-regard and eventual self-disgust.
Conrad h im self could hardly have im agined a more terrible im age o f these ironies than the spectacle, on all our television screens, o f UN soldiers, m ostly Pakistani, firing upon Som ali crowds and killing the w om en and children they w ere m andated to protect. W hen Conrad encapsulated im perial im potence in the im age o f the gunboat in Heart of Darkness, m oored o ff the African shore, lobbing useless shells into the unansw ering jungle, the contem porary im agination leaps to the im age o f NATO warplanes lobbing shells into abandoned Serbian artil lery dugouts. Past and present meet in a shared im age o f the futility o f great power.
Yet we resist th in k in g about such con tinuities. We prefer to im agine the acts o f rescue undertaken since 1989 as exercises in post im perial disinterestedness, as a form o f m oral therapeutics uncon tam in ated by lu st for con quest or im perial rivalry. Nor is this m ere illusion. In the case o f the Iraqi operation, we explicitly forswore the im perial occupation o f Iraq and the rem aking o f its polity. The troops w ere halted on the road to Baghdad. In the case o f the relie f o f the Kurds, again we forswore actual occupation and contented ourselves with an air um brella to allow the Kurds to shape their future as best they could. In the case o f Som alia, we precluded taking over the coun try for the sake o f what was called "a quick exit" strategy. In Bosnia, a land kept in peace th roughout the nineteenth century by either A ustrian or O ttom an dragoons, we su pposed th at the m ere th reat o f our disapproval, trade em bargo, and the occasional lob o f a shell from our aircraft w ould m ake the recourse to dragoons o f our own unnecessary. Skeptical spirits m ight be tem pted to speculate that had Yet the fate o f Kurtz should warn us again st the seductiveness o f im perial ru th lessn ess. N em esis m ay aw ait the ruth less as surely as it awaits the indecisive. In any event, even w hen we forsw ear the b ru talities o f Kurtz, we discover th at C onradian iron ies haun t the h u m an itarian path we chose to tread. Even the "conscience o f the w orld" rem ains a prisoner o f that hubris w hich led Kurtz to boast, "By the sim ple exercise o f our w ill we can exert a pow er for good practically unbounded." Like Kurtz we continue to be stunned into disillusion and bittern ess by the discovery that our good intentions so often end in futility. W hat else but im perial arrogance could have led anyone to assum e th at any outside pow er-even one m andated by the international com m unity-could have gone into Som alia, put an end to factional fighting and then exited, all w ithin m onths? Who but a European or an A m erican could have believed that "the sim ple exercise o f our w ill" could have stopped the Yugoslav catastrophe?
Was our intervention there not deeply colored by an im perial hubris that believes we represent tolerance, civility, decency, and civilization and have the right to spread these treasures am ong the subrational zones o f our w orld?
There was a strong elem ent o f narcissism buried inside the more obvious m otivations leading the West to intervene. We intervened not only to save others but also to save ourselves, or rather an im age o f ourselves as defenders o f universal decencies. We wanted to show that His m ordant and com plex fictions sim ply observe that we were not as pow erful as we supposed; that we did not have the unlim ited power for good that we assum ed; and that we so frequently allowed uncon scionable m eans to tarnish decent ends that a question rem ained as to the real extent o f our com m itm ent to these ends.
That is where we should begin when thinking about the rescue m issions o f the post-Cold War period. Our ventures were more deeply undergirded by illusions o f im perial om nipotence than we knew, more underwritten by unquestioned assum ptions about our goodness than w as prudent; and our failure to sustain decent ends with adequate enough to adm it the paradox: "most o f those who opposed intervention seem ed to understand its gravity in a way that many o f those who backed it did not" (Rieff, 1995:13) .
The point is not to side with the generals against the cam paign ers and to sink into gloomy resignation about our capacity to influence outcom es in a civil war. Nor is it to forsw ear direct m ilitary interven tion in all circum stances. The right conclusion to draw is that m ilitaiy intervention is a lam e second best to effective preventive diplomacy.
Had 
DID IN TE R V EN TIO N MAKE THINGS WORSE?
Having failed diplomatically, W estern leaders then fell back on a tradi tional peacekeeping strategy whose m andate was woefully inadequate It is no disservice to the devotion and courage o f the peacekeep ers, relief w orkers, jou rn alists, and negotiators who "intervened" on our beh alf to ask whether, in the end, they did not m ake things worse.
We sh ould ask, for exam ple, w hether the attem pt to deliver The interventionary strategy that was adopted-to protect the M uslim in safe havens, to keep Sarajevo from fallin g w hile doing nothing to stop Serb bom bardm ent-was perfectly consistent with the conviction that we could not com m it ourselves to a land w ar in the Balkans against the Serbs. In effect, the W est's policy consisted in
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Yet by failing to stop and reverse Serbian aggression, the West becam e complicit in the destruction o f Bosnia and its capital city. The UN allowed itself to becom e the adm inistrator o f the Serbian siege o f Sarajevo. The UN both prevented the city from starving to death, and yet, by doing nothing to break the siege, it helped to prolong the city's suffering. Moral results could hardly be m ore am biguous than this.
The b est one can say is that ou tsid e in terven tion h elped to we can keep them from our doors, and that while they may consum e the roofs o f our neighbors, the sparks will never leap to our own. Yet the fire keeps drawing closer. Once the Heart of Darkness could be set in the rem otest ju n gles o f the European im agination. Now the Heart o f Darkness is in Europe itself, barely two hours journey from our homes.
It is not our conscience alone that should connect us to these zones, but the m ost soberly egotistical calculation o f our interest. Yet this is the frontier o f awareness we have yet to cross.
